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Abstract
We study the online saddle point problem, an online learning problem where at
each iteration a pair of actions need to be chosen without knowledge of the cur-
rent and future (convex-concave) payoff functions. The objective is to minimize
the gap between the cumulative payoffs and the saddle point value of the aggregate
payoff function, which we measure using a metric called “SP-regret”. The prob-
lem generalizes the online convex optimization framework and can be interpreted
as finding the Nash equilibrium for the aggregate of a sequence of two-player
zero-sum games. We propose an algorithm that achieves O˜(
√
T ) SP-regret in the
general case, and O(log T ) SP-regret for the strongly convex-concave case. We
then consider an online convex optimization with knapsacks problem motivated
by a wide variety of applications such as: dynamic pricing, auctions, and crowd-
sourcing. We relate this problem to the online saddle point problem and establish
O(
√
T ) regret using a primal-dual algorithm.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we study the online saddle point (OSP) problem. The OSP problem involves a se-
quence of two-player zero-sum convex-concave games which are selected arbitrarily by Nature. In
each iteration, player 1 chooses an action to minimize its payoffs, while player 2 chooses an action to
maximize its payoffs. Both players choose actions without knowledge of the current and future pay-
off functions. Our goal is to jointly choose a pair of actions for both players at each iteration, such
that each player’s cumulative payoff at the end is as close as possible to that of the Nash equilibrium
(i.e. saddle point) of the aggregate game.
More formally, we define the OSP problem as follows. There is a sequence of unknown functions
{Lt(x, y)}Tt=1 that are convex in x ∈ X and concave in y ∈ Y . Here,X and Y are compact convex
sets in Euclidean space. As a result, there exists a saddle point (x∗, y∗) ∈ X × Y such that
min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
Lt(x, y) =
T∑
t=1
Lt(x∗, y∗) = max
y∈Y
min
x∈X
T∑
t=1
Lt(x, y).
At each iteration t, the decision makers jointly choose a pair of actions (xt, yt) ∈ X × Y , and
then the function Lt is revealed. The goal is to design an algorithm to minimize the cumulative
saddle-point regret (SP-regret), defined as
SP-Regret(T ) =
∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, yt)−min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
Lt(x, y)
∣∣∣∣∣ . (1)
In other words, we would like to obtain a cumulative payoff that is as close as possible to the saddle-
point value if we had known all the functions {Lt}Tt=1 in advance.
We would like to emphasize an important distinction between the OSP problem and the standard
Online Convex Optimization (OCO) problem [21]. In the OCO problem, Nature selects an arbitrary
sequence of convex functions {ft(·)}Tt=1, and the decision maker chooses an action xt ∈ X before
each function ft(·) is revealed. The objective is to minimize the regret defined as
T∑
t=1
ft(xt)−min
x∈X
T∑
t=1
ft(x).
The objective in the OSP problem is to choose the actions of two players jointly such that the payoffs
of both players are close to the Nash equilibrium. In contrast, OCO involves only an individual
player against Nature. The OCO framework can be viewed as a special case of the OSP problem
where the action set of the second player Y is a singleton. Moreover, the standard OCO setting is
applicable to the OSP problem when only one of the players’ payoff is optimized at a time. To be
specific, we define the individual-regret of players 1 and 2 as
Ind-Regretx(T ) =
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, yt)−min
x∈X
T∑
t=1
Lt(x, yt), (2a)
Ind-Regrety(T ) = max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, y)−
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, yt). (2b)
The individual-regret measures each player’s own regret while fixing the other player’s actions. It
is easy to see that minimizing individual-regret (2a) or (2b) can be cast as a standard OCO problem.
However, we will show that SP-regret and individual-regret do not imply one another, so existing
OCO algorithms cannot be directly applied to the OSP problem. More surprisingly, we show that
any OCO algorithm with a sublinear (o(T )) individual-regret will inevitably have a linear (Ω(T ))
SP-regret in the general OSP problem (see details in §5).
In addition to establishing general results for the OSP problem, we focus on one of its prominent
applications: the online convex optimization with knapsacks (OCOwK) problem. Several variants
of the OCOwK problem have recently received a lot of attention in recent literature, but we found
its connection to the OSP problem has not been well exploited. We show that the OCOwK problem
is closely related to the OSP problem through Lagrangian duality; thus, we are able to apply our
results for the OSP problem to the OCOwK problem.
In the OCOwK problem, a decision maker is endowed with a fixed budget of resource at the begin-
ning of T periods. In each period t = 1, . . . , T , the decision maker chooses an action xt ∈ X , and
then the Nature reveals a reward function rt and a budget consumption function ct. The objective is
to maximize total reward
∑T
t=1 rt(xt) while keeping the total consumption
∑T
t=1 ct(xt) within the
given budget.
The OCOwK model also generalizes the standard OCO problem by having an additional budget
constraint. Additionally, it also has a wide range of practical applications (see more discussion in
[8]), some notable examples include:
• Dynamic pricing: a retailer is selling a fixed amount of goods in a finite horizon. The
actions correspond to pricing decisions, the reward is the retailer’s revenue, and the budget
represents finite item inventory. The reward functions are unknown initially due to high
uncertainty in customer demand.
• Online ad auction: a firm is bidding for advertising on a platform (e.g. Google) with limited
daily budget. The actions refer to auction bids, and the reward represents impressions
received from displayed ads. The reward function is unknown because the firm is unaware
of other firms’ bidding strategies.
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• Crowdsourcing: suppose an organization is purchasing labor tasks on a crowdsourcing
platform (e.g. Amazon Mechanical Turk). The actions correspond to prices offered for
each micro-task, and the budget corresponds to the maximum amount of money to be spent
on acquiring these tasks. The reward functions are unknown a priori because of uncertainty
in the crowd’s abilities.
1.1 Main Contributions
We first propose an algorithm calledSP-FTL (Saddle-Point Follow-the-Leader) for the online saddle
point problem, and show that this algorithm has a SP-Regret of O˜(
√
T ), which matches the lower
bound of Ω(
√
T ) up to a logarithmic factor. In the special case where the payoff function Lt(x, y)
is strongly-convex in x and strongly-concave in y, the algorithm has a SP-regret ofO(log T ), which
is optimal.
In addition, we show that no algorithm can simultaneously achieve sublinear (i.e. o(T )) SP-regret
and sublinear individual-regrets (defined in (1) and (2)) in the general OSP problem. This impossi-
bility result further illustrates the contribution of theSP-FTL algorithm, as existing OCO algorithms
designed to achieve sublinear individual-regret are not able to achieve sublinear SP-regret.
Then, we consider the OCOwK problem. We show that this problem is related to the OSP problem
by Lagrangian duality, and a sufficient condition to achieve a sublinear regret for OCOwK is that an
algorithm must have both sublinear SP-regret and sublinear individual-regret for the OSP problem.
In light of the previous impossibility result, we consider the OCOwK problem in a stochastic setting
where the reward and consumption functions are sampled i.i.d. from some unknown distribution. By
applying the SP-FTL algorithm and exploiting the connection between OCOwK and OSP problems,
we obtain a O˜(T 5/6) regret. We then propose a new algorithm called PD-FTL (Primal-Dual Follow-
the-Leader) that achieves an O(
√
T ) regret bound. The result matches the lower bound Ω(
√
T ) for
the OCOwK problem in the stochastic setting. We then provide numerical experiments to compare
the empirical performances of SP-FTL and PD-FTL.
2 Literature Review
Saddle point problems emerge from a variety of fields such as machine learning, statistics, computer
science, and economics. Some applications of the saddle point problem include: minimizing the
maximum of smooth convex functions, minimizing the maximal eigenvalue, l1-minimization (an
important tool in sparsity-oriented Signal processing), nuclear norm minimization, robust learning
problems, and two-player zero-sum games [35, 29, 17, 6, 33, 28, 16, 27].
A few papers have studied the saddle point problem in online learning settings. Motivated by joint
optimization and estimation problems, Ho-Nguyen and Kılınç-Karzan [24] consider an online saddle
point problem similar to ours. They show that the so-called “online saddle point gap,” or using our
terminology, the sum of both players’ individual-regret, is sublinear. However, they did not consider
SP-regret. Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [14] provide a detailed overview of online learning for static
two-player zero-sum games, where the (convex-concave) payoffs are given by Lt(x, y) = L(x, y)
for all t = 1, . . . , T . They show that if both players minimize their individual-regrets, then the
average of actions (x¯, y¯) satisfy |L(x¯, y¯) − L(x∗, y∗)| → 0 as T → ∞, where (x∗, y∗) is a Nash
equilibrium. Abernethy and Wang [2], using the same scheme, establish a connection between
online learning and projection-free optimization by considering a specific static two-player zero-sum
game, where both players apply individual regret minimization algorithms. They also mention this
idea has had applications in boosting, differential privacy, linear programming and flow optimization.
This line of research has been continued in [40, 1].
The Online Convex Optimization with Knapsacks (OCOwK) problem studied in this paper is related
to several previous works on constrained multi-armed bandit problems, online linear programming,
and online convex programming. We next give an overviewof the work related to OCOwK . Agrawal
et al. [5] and Agrawal and Devanur [4] consider online linear/convex programming problems. A key
difference between the online linear/convex programming problems and the OCOwK problem is that
we assume the action must be chosen without knowledge of the function associated with the current
iteration. In [5, 4], it is assumed that these functions are revealed before the action is chosen. Related
work is that of Buchbinder and Naor [13], where they study an online fractional covering/packing
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problem, and that of Gupta and Molinaro [20] where they consider a packing/covering multiple
choice LP problem in a random permutation model.
Mannor et al. [32] consider a variant of the online convex optimization (OCO) problemwhere the ad-
versary may choose extra constraints that must be satisfied. They construct an example such that no
algorithm can attain an ǫ-approximation to the offline problem. In view of such result, several papers
[31, 34, 42] study problems similar to [32] with further restrictions on how constraints are selected
by the adversary. The objective in this line of work is to choose a sequence of decisions to achieve
the offline optimum while making sure the constraints are (almost) satisfied. In this line of research,
the most relevant work to ours is that of [34]. They study OCO with time-varying constraints, the
model is similar to that of [32], however in view of the existing negative results they consider three
different settings. In the first one, both the cost functions and the constraints are arbitrary sequences
of convex functions, however in view of the negative result from [32], the constraints must all be non
positive over a common subset of Rn. In the second setting the sequences of loss functions remain
adversarially chosen however the constraints are sampled i.i.d. from some unknown distribution.
Finally, in the third setting both the sequences of loss functions and constraints are sampled i.i.d.
from some unknown distribution. They develop algorithms for all the three different settings that
ensure the total loss incurred by the algorithm is not too far from the offline optimum and such that
the constraints are almost satisfied. The setup and results are different than ours because they only
require the cumulative constraint violation to be sublinear whereas in OCOwK, once the player ex-
ceeds the budget it can no longer collect rewards. Closely related is the problem of “Online Convex
Optimization with Long Term Constraints”. The setup is similar to that of OCO where the functions
are chosen adversarially with the difference that it is not required that the decisions the player makes
at each step belong to the set. Instead, it is required that the average decision lies in the set (which is
fully known in advance). As the authors explain, this problem is useful to avoid the projection step
of online gradient descent (OGD) and it allows to solve problems such as multi-objective online clas-
sification [10], and for using the popular online-to-batch conversion. The algorithms they develop
consist on simultaneously running two copies of variants of OGD on convex-concave functions. Bet-
ter rates and slightly different guarantees were obtained for the same problem in [44, 25, 43]. In [37]
they study a continuous time version of a problem similar to that of [31] and show that a continuous
time version of primal-dual online gradient descent in continuous time guarantees small regret. In
[15] motivated by an application in low-latency fog computing they consider a problem similar to
that in [30] however there is bandit feedback in the loss function. The algorithm they provide is
primal-dual online gradient descent that combines ideas from [19] to deal with bandit feedback.
Most closely related to our model is the constrained multi-armed bandit problem studied by Badani-
diyuru et al. [8] and Wu et al. [41]. In this problem, there is a finite set of arms, and each arm yields
a random reward and consumes resources when it is pulled. The goal is to maximize total reward
without exceeding a total budget. The Bandits with Knapsacks problem can be viewed as a special
case of the OCOwK problem, where the reward and consumption functions are both linear. Agrawal
and Devanur [3] study a generalization of bandits with concave rewards and convex knapsack con-
straints. Similar problems have also been studied in specific application contexts, such as online ad
auction [9] and dynamic pricing [11, 18].
3 Preliminaries
We introduce some notation and definitions that will be used in later sections. By default, all vectors
are column vectors. A vector with entries x1, ..., xn is written as x = [x1; ...;xn] = [x1, ..., xn]
⊤,
where ⊤ denotes the transpose. Let ‖ · ‖ be the Euclidean norm of a vector.
We say a function L(x, y) is convex-concave if it is convex in x ∈ X and concave in y ∈ Y . A pair
(x∗, y∗) is called a saddle point for L if for any x ∈ X and any y ∈ Y , we have
L(x∗, y) ≤ L(x∗, y∗) ≤ L(x, y∗). (3)
It is well known that if L is convex-concave, and X and Y are convex compact sets, there always
exists at least one saddle point (see e.g. [12]).
We say that a function f : X → R is H-strongly convex if for any x1, x2 ∈ X , it holds that
f(x1) ≥ f(x2) +∇f(x2)⊤(x1 − x2) + H
2
‖x1 − x2‖2.
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Here, ∇f(x) denotes a subgradient of f at x. Strong convexity implies that the problem
minx∈X f(x) has a unique solution. We say a function g isH-strongly concave if −g isH-strongly
convex. Furthermore, we say a function L(x, y) is H-strongly convex-concave if for any fixed
y0 ∈ Y , the function L(x, y0) is H-strongly convex in x, and for any fixed x0 ∈ X , the function
L(x0, y) is H-strongly concave in y. If L is H-strongly convex-concave, then there exists a unique
saddle point.
We say a function L(x, y) is G-Lipschitz continuous if
|L(x1, y1)− L(x2, y2)| ≤ G‖[x1; y1]− [x2; y2]‖.
It is well known that the previous inequality holds if and only if
‖[∇xL(x, y);∇yL(x, y)]‖ ≤ G
for all x ∈ X , y ∈ Y [12].
Throughout the paper we will use the big O notation to hide constant factors. For two functions
f(T ) and g(T ) > 0, we write f(T ) = O(g(T )) if there exists a constant M1 and a constant T1
such that f(T ) ≤ M1g(T ) for all T ≥ T1; we write f(T ) = Ω(g(T )) if there exists a constant
M2 and a constant T2 such that f(T ) ≥ M2g(T ) for all T ≥ T2. We use the O˜ notation to
hide constant factors and poly-logarithmic factors. More specifically, for two functions f(T ) and
g(T ) > 0, we write f(T ) = O˜(g(T )) if there exists constants M3, T3 and an integer k ≥ 0 such
that f(T ) ≤M3g(T ) logk(g(T )) for all T ≥ T3.
4 The Online Saddle Point Problem
4.1 The Strongly Convex-Concave Case
We now present algorithms for the OSP problem with guaranteed sublinear SP-regret. Recall that
the SP-regret defined in (1) measures the gap between the cumulative value achieved by an online
algorithm and the value of the game under the Nash equilibrium if all functions are known in hind-
sight.
For simplicity we assume T is known in advance (this assumption can be relaxed using the well
known doubling trick from [14, 38]). We first consider the case where the functions {Lt}Tt=1 are
strongly convex-concave. We show that the following simple algorithm Saddle-Point Follow-the-
Leader (SP-FTL), which is a variant of the Follow-the-Leader (FTL) algorithm by Kalai and Vem-
pala [26], attains sublinear SP-regret.
Algorithm 1 Saddle-Point Follow-the-Leader (SP-FTL)
input: x1 ∈ X , y1 ∈ Y
for t = 1, ..., T do
Choose actions (xt, yt)
Observe function Lt
Set xt+1 ← argminx∈X maxy∈Y
∑t
τ=1Lτ (x, y)
Set yt+1 ← argmaxy∈Y minx∈X
∑t
τ=1 Lτ (x, y)
end for
The main difference between SP-FTL and FTL is that in SP-FTL both players update jointly
and play the (unique) saddle point of the sum of the games observed so far. In contrast, the up-
dates for Follow-the-Leader would be xFTLt+1 ← argminx∈X
∑t
τ=1 Lτ (x, yFTLτ ) and yFTLt+1 ←
argmaxy∈Y
∑t
τ=1 Lτ (xFTLτ , y) for t = 2, ..., T and xFTL1 , yFTL1 are arbitrarily chosen from their
respective sets X and Y . It is easy to see that the sequence of iterates is in general not the same.
In fact, in view of Theorem 3 we will see that FTL can not achieve sublinear SP-Regret when the
sequence of functions is chosen arbitrarily.
Theorem 1. Let {Lt(x, y)}Tt=1 be an arbitrary sequence ofH-strongly convex-concave,G-Lipschitz
functions. Then, the SP-FTL algorithm guarantees
SP-Regret(T ) =
∣∣∣ T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, yt)−min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
Lt(x, y)
∣∣∣ ≤ 8G2
H
(1 + logT ).
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The proof of Theorem 1 is based on the following two lemmas. We first analyze a quantity that is
similar to SP-regret, but with actions (xt, yt) replaced by (xt+1, yt+1) (Lemma 1). This analysis
framework is known as the Follow-the-Leader vs. Be-the-Leader scheme [26]. We then show that
consecutive iterates of SP-FTL have distances diminishing in the order ofO(1/t). The proof heavily
utilizes the KKT conditions associated with points (xt, yt) and (xt+1, yt+1) (Lemma 2).
Lemma 1. Let {(xt, yt)}Tt=1 be the iterates of SP-FTL. It holds that
−G
T∑
t=1
‖xt − xt+1‖ ≤
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt+1, yt+1)−min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
Lt(x, y) ≤ G
T∑
t=1
‖yt − yt+1‖. (4)
Proof. Proof. We first prove the second inequality. We proceed by induction. The base case t = 1
holds by definition of (x2, y2), indeed
L1(x2, y2) +G‖y1 − y2‖ ≥ L1(x2, y2) := min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
L1(x, y).
We now assume the following claim holds for T − 1:
min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
T−1∑
t=1
Lt(x, y) ≥
T−1∑
t=1
Lt(xt+1, yt+1)−G
T−1∑
t=1
‖yt − yt+1‖, (5)
and show it holds for T .
min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
Lt(x, y)
=
T−1∑
t=1
Lt(xT+1, yT+1) + LT (xT+1, yT+1)
≥
T−1∑
t=1
Lt(xT+1, yT ) + LT (xT+1, yT ) by Equation (3)
≥
T−1∑
t=1
Lt(xT , yT ) + LT (xT+1, yT ) by Equation (3)
≥
T−1∑
t=1
Lt(xt+1, yt+1)−G
T−1∑
t=1
‖yt − yt+1‖+ LT (xT+1, yT ) by Equation (5)
=
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt+1, yt+1)−G
T−1∑
t=1
‖yt − yt+1‖+ LT (xT+1, yT )− LT (xT+1, yT+1)
≥
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt+1, yt+1)−G
T−1∑
t=1
‖yt − yt+1‖ −G‖yT − yT+1‖
=
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt+1, yt+1)−G
T∑
t=1
‖yt − yt+1‖.
We now show by induction that
min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
Lt(x, y) ≤
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt+1, yt+1) +G
T∑
t=1
‖xt − xt+1‖.
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Indeed, t = 1 follows from the definition of (x2, y2). We now assume the claim holds for T − 1 and
prove it for T :
min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
Lt(x, y)
=
T∑
t=1
Lt(xT+1, yT+1)
≤
T−1∑
t=1
Lt(xT , yT+1) + LT (xT , yT+1) by Equation (3)
≤
T−1∑
t=1
Lt(xT , yT ) + LT (xT , yT+1) by Equation (3)
≤
T−1∑
t=1
Lt(xt+1, yt+1) +G
T−1∑
t=1
‖xt − xt+1‖
+ LT (xT , yT+1) + LT (xT+1, yT+1)− LT (xT+1, yT+1) by induction claim
≤
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt+1, yt+1) +G
T∑
t=1
‖xt − xt+1‖ since LT is G-Lipschitz.
Lemma 2. Let {(xt, yt)}Tt=1 be the iterates of SP-FTL. It holds that
||xt − xt+1||+ ||yt − yt+1|| ≤ 4G
Ht
.
Proof. Proof. Fix t. Define
J(x, y) ,
t−1∑
τ=1
Lτ (x, y) + Lt(x, y)
so that (xt+1, yt+1) = minx∈X maxy∈Y J(x, y). Since J is Ht-strongly convex it holds that for
any x ∈ X and any y ∈ Y
J(x, y) ≥ J(xt+1, y) +∇xJ(xt+1, y)⊤(x− xt+1) + Ht
2
‖x− xt+1‖2.
Plugging in y = yt+1 and recalling the KKT condition∇xJ(xt+1, yt+1)⊤(x− xt+1) ≥ 0, we have
that for any x ∈ X
2
Ht
[
J(x, yt+1)− J(xt+1, yt+1)
] ≥ ‖x− xt+1‖2. (6)
Similarly, since J is Ht strongly concave. That is, for any y ∈ Y
J(xt+1, y) ≤ J(xt+1, yt+1) +∇yJ(xt+1, yt+1)⊤(y − yt+1)− Ht
2
‖y − yt+1‖2.
Together with the KKT condition∇yJ(xt+1, yt+1)⊤(y − yt+1) ≤ 0 we get that for any y ∈ Y
2
Ht
[
J(xt+1, yt+1)− J(xt+1, y)
] ≥ ‖y − yt+1‖2. (7)
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Adding up Equations (6) and (7), plugging x = xt and y = yt we get
2
Ht
[
J(xt, yt+1)− J(xt+1, yt)
] ≥ ‖xt − xt+1‖2 + ‖yt − yt+1‖2
⇐⇒ 2
Ht
[ t−1∑
τ=1
Lτ (xt, yt+1) + Lt(xt, yt+1)− [
t−1∑
τ=1
Lτ (xt+1, yt) + Lt(xt+1, yt)]
]
≥ ‖xt − xt+1‖2 + ‖yt − yt+1‖2
=⇒ 2
Ht
[ t−1∑
τ=1
Lτ (xt, yt) + Lt(xt, yt+1)− [
t−1∑
τ=1
Lτ (xt+1, yt) + Lt(xt+1, yt)]
]
≥ ‖xt − xt+1‖2 + ‖yt − yt+1‖2.
since
∑t−1
τ=1Lτ (xt, yt+1) ≤
∑t−1
τ=1Lτ (xt, yt).
Additionally, since
∑t−1
τ=1Lτ (xt, yt) ≤
∑t−1
τ=1 Lτ (xt+1, yt) we have
2
Ht
[ t−1∑
τ=1
Lτ (xt, yt) + Lt(xt, yt+1)−
t−1∑
τ=1
Lτ (xt, yt)− Lt(xt+1, yt)
]
≥ ‖xt − xt+1‖2 + ‖yt − yt+1‖2
⇐⇒ 2
Ht
[Lt(xt, yt+1)− Lt(xt+1, yt)] ≥ ‖xt − xt+1‖2 + ‖yt − yt+1‖2
=⇒ 2
Ht
G‖[xt; yt+1]− [xt+1; yt]‖ ≥ ‖xt − xt+1‖2 + ‖yt − yt+1‖2
=⇒ 2
Ht
G
[‖xt − xt+1‖+ ‖yt − yt+1‖] ≥ ‖xt − xt+1‖2 + ‖yt − yt+1‖2
=⇒ 2G
Ht
≥ ‖xt − xt+1‖
2 + ‖yt − yt+1‖2
‖xt − xt+1‖+ ‖yt − yt+1‖ .
Now, since x2 is a convex function a
2
2 +
b2
2 ≥
(
a+b
2
)2
therefore a2 + b2 ≥ (a+b)22 . This, together
with the last implication, yields the result
4G
Ht
≥ ‖xt − xt+1‖+ ‖yt − yt+1‖.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 1.
8
Proof. Proof of Theorem 1. We have
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, yt)−min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
Lt(x, y)
≤
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, yt)−
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt+1, yt+1) +G
T∑
t=1
‖yt − yt+1‖ by Lemma 1
≤
T∑
t=1
G‖[xt; yt]− [xt+1; yt+1]‖+G
T∑
t=1
‖yt − yt+1‖ since Lt is G-Lipschitz
≤ G
T∑
t=1
‖xt − xt+1‖+ ‖yt − yt+1‖+G
T∑
t=1
‖yt − yt+1‖
≤ G
T∑
t=1
4G
Ht
+G
T∑
t=1
4G
Ht
by Lemma 2
≤ 8G
2
H
(1 +
∫ T
1
1
t
dt)
=
8G2
H
(1 + lnT ).
The other side of the inequality follows analogously by using the other inequality in Lemma 1.
4.2 The General Convex-Concave Case
We now consider the general case where {Lt}Tt=1 is convex-concave, but not necessarily strongly
convex-concave. We define a new sequence of functions given by
L¯t(x, y) , Lt(x, y) +H‖x‖2 −H‖y‖2. (8)
It can be easily verified that L¯t(x, y) is H-strongly convex-concave. We will then run SP-FTL on
this modified sequence of functions.
Theorem 2. Let {Lt(x, y)}Tt=1 be an arbitrary sequence of convex-concave functions. Then, run-
ning SP-FTL on L¯t(x, y) as defined in (8) with H = 1√T guarantees
SP-Regret(T ) =
∣∣∣ T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, yt)−min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
Lt(x, y)
∣∣∣ ≤ O˜(√T ).
Before diving into the proof of Theorem 2 we must establish some notation. LetDX = supx∈X ‖x‖,
DY = supy∈Y ‖y‖. Notice that by definition of L¯t , Lt(x, y) +H‖x‖2 −H‖y‖2, using the fact
that ‖ · ‖ is nonnegative everywhere, we have that for all x ∈ X, y ∈ Y
−HD2Y ≤ L¯t(x, y)− Lt(x, y) ≤ HD2X , ∀t = 1, . . . , T. (9)
Before we prove the theorem, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 3. It holds that
−HD2Y T ≤ min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
L¯t(x, y)−min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
Lt(x, y) ≤ HD2XT.
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Proof. Proof. Let x′t+1 ∈ argminx∈X maxy∈Y
∑t
τ=1 Lτ (x, y), y′t+1 ∈
argmaxy∈Y minx∈X
∑t
τ=1 Lτ (x, y). We have
min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
L¯t(x, y)
,
T∑
t=1
L¯t(xT+1, yT+1)
=
T∑
t=1
[Lt(xT+1, yT+1) +H‖xT+1‖2 −H‖yT+1‖2]
≤
T∑
t=1
[Lt(x′T+1, yT+1) +H‖x′T+1‖2 −H‖yT+1‖2] by Equation (3)
≤
T∑
t=1
[Lt(x′T+1, yT+1) +H‖x′T+1‖2]
≤
T∑
t=1
[Lt(x′T+1, y′T+1) +H‖x′T+1‖2] by Equation (3)
≤
T∑
t=1
Lt(x′T+1, y′T+1) +HD2XT
, min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
Lt(x, y) +HD2XT.
The other inequality follows from the same reasoning.
We are now ready to prove the theorem.
Proof. Proof of Theorem 2. Since Lt is G-Lipschitz continuous, it holds that L¯t is (G+ 2H(DX +
DY ))- Lipschitz continuous. Therefore,
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, yt)−min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
Lt(x, y)
≤
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, yt)−min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
L¯t(x, y) +HD2XT by Lemma 3
≤
T∑
t=1
L¯t(xt, yt)−min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
L¯t(x, y) +HT (D2X +D2Y ) by Equation (9)
≤ 8(G+ 2H(DX +DY ))
2(1 + ln(T ))
H
+HT (D2X +D
2
Y ). by Theorem 1
Similarly, we have
min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
Lt(x, y)−
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, yt)
≤ min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
L¯t(x, y) −
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, yt) +HTD2Y by Lemma 3
≤ min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
L¯t(x, y) −
T∑
t=1
L¯t(xt, yt) +HTD2Y by Equation (9)
≤ 8(G+ 2H(DX +DY ))
2(1 + ln(T ))
H
+HT (D2Y +D
2
X). by Theorem 1
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ChoosingH = 1√
T
yields the result.
We note that the rate in Theorem 1 is optimal with respect to T , since when Y is a singleton, the
problem reduces to the OCO problem with strongly convex loss functions. In that case, it is well
known that no algorithm can achieve regret smaller than Ω(log(T )) [23]. Similarly, the O˜(
√
T ) rate
in Theorem 2 is optimal with respect to T up to a logarithmic factor according to the Ω(
√
T ) lower
bound result for the general OCO problem [21].
Although the focus of our work is mainly concerned with showing sublinear rate of SP-Regret, it is
worth discussing the computation complexity for each iteration of our algorithms. Notice that in each
iteration we must solve a strongly convex strongly concave constrained saddle point problem. It is
well known that by simultaneously playing two no Individual Regret algorithms for strongly convex
functions (such as those in [22] which achieve Individual RegretO(log(K))), one can generate after
K rounds a solution to the problem that isO(log(K)/K) close to the Nash Equilibrium (in terms of
the value of the game) (See Theorem 9 in [1]). Recently [1] showed that with additional smoothness
assumptions it is possible to obtain linear convergence rates for some static saddle point problems.
It is also possible to solve the subproblem for each iteration using the (Stochastic Approximation)
Mirror Descent algorithm from [36]. All the previously discussed algorithms are variants of the
seminal work of [7].
5 Relationship Between SP-regret and individual-regret
We have defined two regret metrics for the OSP problem, namely the SP-regret (1) and the individual-
regret (2). In the previous subsection, we proposed an algorithm (SP-FTL) with sublinear SP-
regret. We have also mentioned that any OCO algorithm (e.g., online gradient descent, online mirror
descent, Follow-the-Leader) can achieve sublinear individual-regret. A natural question is whether
there exists a single algorithm that has both sublinear SP-regret and individual-regret. Surprisingly,
the answer is negative.
Theorem 3. If the sequence of convex-concave functions {Lt}Tt=1 is chosen arbitrarily, for any
online algorithm, either SP-Regret(T ) or Ind-Regret(T ) is Ω(T ).
To prove the negative result, we construct the following problem instance. The T iterations are
evenly split into two halves. In the first ⌊T/2⌋ iterations, the payoff function is Lt(x, y) = x2 + xy.
In the remaining iterations, Nature chooses two cases with equal probability: 1) Lt(x, y) = 0,
or 2) Lt(x, y) = −(y − 1)2. The feasible action sets are X = [−1, 1], Y = [−1, 1]. Note
that in case 1, the saddle point value for the aggregate payoff function over T iterations is
minx∈X maxy∈Y
∑T
t=1 Lt(x, y) = 0. In case 2, the saddle point value for the aggregate payoff
function is minx∈X maxy∈Y
∑T
t=1 Lt(x, y) = −T/5.
We then prove the result by contradiction. Suppose there exists an algorithm that has sublinear
SP-regret and sublinear individual-regret for both cases. In case 1, in order to achieve sublinear
SP-regret and individual-regret, it can be shown that the action sequence selected by the algorithm
must satisfy
∑⌊T/2⌋
t=1 x
2
t = o(T ). Since the algorithm cannot differentiate between case 1 and case
2 up to iteration ⌊T/2⌋, the same equation holds in case 2, which implies the sum of SP-regret and
player 2’s individual-regret in case 2 is at least T/5 − o(T ). This contradicts with the assumption
that the algorithm has sublinear SP-regret and individual-regret for case 2.
We note that despite the negative result in Theorem 3, it is possible to achieve both sublinear SP-
regret and individual-regret with further assumptions on the payoff functions {Lt}Tt=1.
One such example is where Lt(x, y) is sampled i.i.d. ; this case is discussed in §6. However, in light
of Theorem 3, in the general case where {Lt}Tt=1 is an arbitrary sequence, the best one can hope
for is achieve either SP-regret or individual-regret, but not both. In §7.1, we include a numerical
example to further illustrate the relationship between SP-regret and individual-regret.
5.1 Proof of the Impossibility Result
We now present a formal proof of the impossibility result.
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Proof. Proof of Theorem 3. We prove the result by contradiction. Consider the following example.
There are 2T time periods. LetX = [−1, 1], Y = [−1, 1]. For t = 1, · · · , T , let Lt(x, y) = x2+xy.
For t = T + 1, · · · , 2T , either Lt = 0 (Case 1) or Lt(x, y) = −(y − 1)2 (Case 2). We have
max
y∈Y
2T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, y)−min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
2T∑
t=1
Lt(x, y)
=max
y∈Y
2T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, y)−
2T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, yt) +
2T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, yt)−min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
2T∑
t=1
Lt(x, y)
≤max
y∈Y
2T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, y)−
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, yt) +
∣∣∣∣∣
2T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, yt)−min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
2T∑
t=1
Lt(x, y)
∣∣∣∣∣
=Ind-Regrety(2T ) + SP-Regret(2T ).
If both saddle-point regret or individual regret are o(T ), then for both Case 1 and Case 2, it holds
that
max
y∈Y
2T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, y)−min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
2T∑
t=1
Lt(x, y) ≤ o(T ). (10)
Case 1: We have
max
y∈Y
2T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, y)−min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
2T∑
t=1
Lt(x, y) =
T∑
t=1
x2t +max
y∈Y
(
T∑
t=1
xt
)
y − T min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
(x2 + xy)
=
T∑
t=1
x2t +max
y∈Y
(
T∑
t=1
xt
)
y,
which implies
∑T
t=1 x
2
t = o(T ) and
∣∣∣∑Tt=1 xt∣∣∣ = o(T ). Note that min−1≤x≤1max−1≤x≤1(x2 +
xy) = 0; the unique saddle point is x = 0, y = 0.
Case 2: We get
max
y∈Y
2T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, y)−min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
2T∑
t=1
Lt(x, y)
=
T∑
t=1
x2t +max
y∈Y
(
T∑
t=1
xty − T (y − 1)2
)
− T min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
(
x2 + xy − (y − 1)2) .
With some calculation, one can show that
min
−1≤x≤1
max
−1≤y≤1
(
x2 + xy − (y − 1)2) = −1
5
,
where the unique saddle point is x = − 25 , y = 45 .
Since the policy must choose the same sequence {xt, t = 1, . . . , T } for Case 1 and Case 2, we have∑T
t=1 x
2
t ≤ o(T ) and
∣∣∣∑Tt=1 xt∣∣∣ ≤ o(T ). (This argument can be extended to randomized online
algorithms as well by considering the expectation of these quantities.) Thus,
T∑
t=1
x2t +max
y∈Y
(
T∑
t=1
xty − T (y − 1)2
)
≥
T∑
t=1
x2t +
T∑
t=1
xt = −o(T ) (by setting y = 1).
Therefore, we get
max
y∈Y
2T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, y)−min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
2T∑
t=1
Lt(x, y) =
T
5
− o(T ),
which contradicts with Equation (10).
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6 Online Convex Optimization with Knapsacks
Next, we consider the online convex optimization with knapsacks (OCOwK) problem, motivated
by various applications in dynamic pricing, online ad auctions, and crowdsourcing (see §1). The
OCOwK model generalizes the standard OCO framework by having an additional set of resource
constraints. We will show that OCOwK is closely related to the OSP problem studied in §4.
In this problem, the decision maker has a set of resources i = 1, . . . ,m with given budgets b =
(bi)i∈[m]. There are T time periods. At each time period, the decision maker chooses xt ∈ X ⊂ Rn.
After the decision is chosen, Nature reveals two functions: a concave reward function rt : X → R,
and a convex resource consumption function ct : X → Rm+ .
The objective is to maximize cumulative reward while satisfying the budget constraints. In particular,
we assume that if a decision xt violates any of the budget constraints, no reward is collected at period
t. Therefore, the decision maker’s cumulative reward is given by
R(x1, x2, · · · , xT ) =
T∑
t=1
(
rt(xt)I
[ t∑
τ=1
cτ (xτ ) ≤ b
])
, (11)
where I[·] denotes the indicator function. In (11), if b = +∞, the problem reduces to the standard
OCO setting.
In order to guarantee that the budget constraint can always be satisfied, we assume there exists a
“null action” that doesn’t consume any resource or generate any reward.
Assumption 1. There exists an action x0 ∈ X such that rt(x0) ≡ 0 and ct(x0) ≡ 0 for all
t = 1, . . . , T .
The “null action” assumption is often satisfied in different application domains of OCOwK. For
example, in the dynamic pricing context, the “null action” is equivalent to charging an extremely
high price so there is no customer demand; in the auction context, the “null action” corresponds to
bidding at $0.
If the reward and consumption functions are chosen arbitrarily, it can be shown that no algorithm
can achieve sublinear regret for OCOwK. Intuitively, if the reward and consumption functions shift
at ⌊T/2⌋, no algorithm can recover the mistake made before T/2 in the remaining periods (which
is similar to the case in §5). Therefore, we consider the setting where the reward and consumption
functions are stochastic.
Assumption 2. For t = 1, . . . , T , the reward function rt and consumption function ct are sampled
i.i.d. from a fixed joint distribution.
Notice that even when the reward and consumption distribution is known, the optimal policy for the
OCOwK problem is not a static decision, as the optimal decision depends on the remaining time and
remaining budget. Therefore, defining the offline benchmark for OCOwK is not as straightforward
as in the stochastic OCO setting. However, it has been shown in the literature that the following
offline convex problem provides an upper bound of the expected reward of the optimal offline policy
under Assumption 2 (see e.g. [8, 11]):
r∗ , max
x∈X
{
T∑
t=1
E[rt(x)], subject to
T∑
t=1
E[ct(x)] ≤ b
}
(12)
Therefore, we define the expected regret for the OCOwK problem as
Regret(T ) , r∗ − E[R(x1, x2, · · · , xT )],
where the expectation is taken with respect to the random realizations of functions rt and ct.
6.1 Reduction to a Saddle Point Problem
We relate the OCOwK problem to the OSP problem studied in §4 by defining a function Lt(x, y) ,
−rt(x) − y⊤(b/T − ct(x)), ∀y ∈ Rm+ . Note that Lt(x, y) is convex in x and concave in y, so
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we can treat Lt(x, y) as a payoff function in the OSP problem. Here, y can be viewed as the dual
prices associated with the budget constraints in (12), and the function Lt(x, y) penalizes the payoff
if consumption at iteration t exceeds the average budget per period.
We let constant yimax be the maximum reward that can be gained by adding one unit of resource i,
and define set Y =
∏m
i=1[0, y
i
max]. For any sequence of decisions x1, · · · , xT , we claim that the
decision maker’s total reward is bounded by
R(x1, x2, · · · , xT ) ≥
T∑
t=1
rt(xt) + min
y∈Y
{
y⊤
T∑
t=1
(b/T − ct(xt))
}
= −max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, y). (13)
To see this, consider a modified OCOwK problemwhere resource consumption is allowed to go over
the budget, but the decision maker must pay yimax for each additional unit of resource i used over
bi. By the definition of y
i
max, the decision maker’s profit under the modified problem is given by the
right-hand side of (13), which is a lower bound of the reward in the original problem.
We now consider the benchmark (12). By Assumption 1, the Slater condition holds for the convex
optimization problem (12); so by using strong duality, we have
r∗ = −min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
{
−
T∑
t=1
E[rt(x)] − y⊤
T∑
t=1
(b/T − E[ct(x)])
}
= −min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
E[
T∑
t=1
Lt(x, y)].
Therefore, the expected regret for OCOwK is bounded by
Regret(T ) = r∗ − E[R(x1, x2, · · · , xT )]
≤E
[
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, y)
]
−min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
E
[ T∑
t=1
Lt(x, y)
]
=E
[
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, y)−
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, yt)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(†)
+E
[ T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, yt)
]
−min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
E
[ T∑
t=1
Lt(x, y)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(‡)
(14)
We have bounded the regret of the OCOwK problem by two quantities in a related OSP problem. In
particular, the term (†) is equal to the expectation of player 2’s individual-regret (see Eq (2b)), and
the second term is related to the SP-regret.
6.2 Algorithms for OCOwK
Motivated by its connection to the OSP problem, we propose two algorithms for the OCOwK prob-
lem. For clarity we defer all proofs to the next subsections.
First, we consider SP-FTL defined in Algorithm 1. In view of Eq (14), we can bound the regret for
OCOwK by the sum of an individual-regret and the SP-regret. Theorem 2 has already provided a SP-
regret bound for SP-FTL, so we just need to prove a sublinear individual-regret bound. In general,
this is impossible due to the negative result in Theorem 3. However, since we made the additional
assumption that rt and ct are sampled i.i.d., we are able to get a sublinear individual-regret for
SP-FTL in the OCOwK problem.
We start by establishing a high probability bound on the individual-regret for the general OSP prob-
lem when the payoff function Lt(x, y) is strongly convex-concave.
Lemma 4. SupposeLt is i.i.d.,H-strongly convex-concave andG-Lipschitz. Let d be the dimension
ofX × Y , andDXY be its diameter. Then, with probability at least 1− 1/T , SP-FTL guarantees
Ind-Regrety(T ) ≤
8G2
H
(1 + ln(T )) +O
(G3/2D1/2XY (d ln(T ) ln(dT ))1/4T 3/4
H1/2
)
.
The proof of Lemma 4 uses a concentration inequality for Lipschitz functions by Shalev-Shwartz et
al. [39]. The key step in the proof is to show that the solution of the sample average approximation
at step t i.e. xt is close to x
∗, the saddle point of the expected game.
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However, we cannot directly use Lemma 4 to bound the individual-regret term (†) in (14) because
the function Lt(x, y) is linear in y and thus not strongly convex-concave. We add a regularization
term to Lt(x, y) to make itH-strongly convex-concave. Notice our choice of the regularization term
here is not the same as in Theorem 2, which leads to a O˜(T 5/6) bound in the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Define L¯t(x, y) , Lt(x, y) +H‖x‖2−H‖y‖2, whereH , T−1/6. Applying the SP-
FTL algorithm on functions {L¯t}Tt=1 guarantees that the following inequality holds with probability
at least 1− 1/T :
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, y)−
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, yt) ≤ O
(
(d log(T ) log(dT ))1/4T 5/6
)
. (15)
This implies the expected regret for the OCOwK problem using SP-FTL is O˜(T 5/6).
Next, we present an algorithm for OCOwK that improves the regret bound in Theorem 4. The key
idea of this algorithm is to update primal variable x and dual variable y of Lt(x, y) in parallel. We
call this algorithm Primal-Dual Follow-the-Leader (PD-FTL) (see Algorithm 2).
Algorithm 2 Primal-Dual Regularized Follow-the-Leader (PD-RFTL)
input: x1 ∈ X , y1 ∈ Y
for t = 1, ..., T do
Play (xt, yt)
Observe Lt; define ft(x) , Lt(x, yt) and gt(y) , Lt(xt, y)
Set xt+1 = argminx∈X
∑t
τ=1
[
fτ (x) +
1√
T
(‖x− xτ‖2)
]
Set yt+1 = argminy≥0
∑t
τ=1
[
gτ (y)− 1√T (‖y − yτ‖2)
]
end for
We again bound the regret of PD-RFTL using Eq (14). Recall that for SP-FTL, it was more
challenging to bound the first term (†) and relatively easy to bound the term (‡). For PD-RFTL
it is quite the opposite. By defining gt(y) , Lt(xt, y), the first term (†) can be written as
E[maxy∈Y
∑T
t=1 gt(y) −
∑T
t=1 gt(yt)], so we immediately have (†) = O(
√
T ) using the regret
bound for Regularized Follow-the-Leader in the OCO setting. To bound the second term (‡), we
have the following result.
Theorem 5. For PD-RFTL, it holds that
(‡) , E
[
max
y
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, y)
]
−min
x∈X
max
y≥0
E
[
T∑
t=1
Lt(x, y)
]
≤ O(
√
T ),
which implies that the expected regret for the OCOwK problem using PD-RFTL is O(
√
T ).
Compared to other algorithms for OCOwK, including the UCB-based algorithm in [8, 3] and Thomp-
son sampling-based algorithm in [18], the proof for Theorem 5 is surprisingly simple, as we are able
to exploit the connection between OCOwK and the OSP problem.
TheO(
√
T ) regret bound in Theorem 5 also gives the best possible rate in T , since OCO is a special
case of OCOwK, and it is well-known that any algorithm must have Ω(
√
T ) regret for the general
OCO problem. In Section 7.2, we compare the performance of SP-FTL and PD-FTL in a numerical
experiment.
Remark 1. Our proof for Theorem 5 allows the RFTL subroutine in Algorithm 2 being replaced
with other OCO algorithms with O(
√
T ) regret (e.g. online gradient descent, online mirror descent).
In particular, we can extend Algorithm 2 to the bandit setting of OCOwK, where we only observe
the values rt(xt) and ct(xt) after xt is chosen. By replacing the RFTL subroutine with any Bandit
Convex Optimization (BCO) algorithm, we can also establish sublinear regret bounds for OCOwK
in the bandit setting.
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6.3 Proof of SP-FTL for OCOwK
In this section we present the analysis of SP-FTL, applied to the OCOwK problem. The following
result from Shalev-Shwartz et al. [39] (Theorem 5) will be useful.
Theorem 6 ([39]). Let f(w, ξ) : W × Ξ→ R be G-Lipschitz with respect to w, whereW ⊂ Rd is
bounded with diameterDW . Then with probability at least 1− δ, for all w ∈W , it holds that
∣∣∣ T∑
t=1
f(w, ξt)− TEξ[f(x, ξ)]
∣∣∣ ≤ O(GDW
√
d ln(T ) ln(
d
δ
)T
)
.
First, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 5. Let (xt, yt) be the the iterates of SPFTL.With probability at least 1−δ, for any t = 1, ...T
it holds that
‖xt+1 − x∗‖ ≤ O
(G1/2D1/2XY (d ln(t) ln(dδ ))1/4
H1/2t1/4
)
. (16)
Proof. Proof. Define the concentration error at time t as
CEt , O
(
GDXY
√
d ln(t) ln(
d
δ
)t
)
. (17)
Notice that Lτ satisfies all the assumptions of Theorem 6, so with probability at least 1 − δ, for all
x ∈ X, y ∈ Y we have
∣∣ t∑
τ=1
Lτ (x, y)− tL¯(x, y)
∣∣ ≤ CEt. (18)
We now derive some consequences of this fact. With probability at least 1− δ.
tL¯(x∗, y∗) ≤ tL¯(xt+1, y¯) by definition of x∗
≤
t∑
τ=1
Lτ (xt+1, y∗) + CEt by Equation (18)
≤
t∑
τ=1
Lτ (xt+1, yt+1) + CEt. by definition of yt+1
This implies
tL¯(x∗, y∗)−
t∑
τ=1
Lτ (xt+1, yt+1) ≤ CEt. (19)
We now show that
t∑
τ=1
Lτ (x∗, yt+1)− tL¯(x∗, y∗) ≤ CEt. (20)
Indeed, it holds that
t∑
τ=1
Lτ (x∗, yt+1) ≤ tL¯(x∗, yt+1) + CEt by Equation 18
≤ tL¯(x∗, y∗) + CEt. by definition of y∗
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Now, using the fact that xt+1 is the saddle point of
∑t
τ=1Lτ (x, y), which is (Ht)-strongly convex,
we have that
Ht
2
‖xt+1 − x∗‖2 ≤
t∑
τ=1
Lτ (x∗, yt+1)−
t∑
τ=1
Lτ (xt+1, yt+1)
=
t∑
τ=1
Lτ (x∗, yt+1)− tL¯(x∗, y∗) + tL¯(x∗, y∗)−
t∑
τ=1
Lτ (xt+1, yt+1)
≤ 2CEt by Equations (19) and (20).
It follows that
‖xt+1 − x∗‖ ≤ O
(G1/2D1/2XY (d ln(t) ln(dδ ))1/4
H1/2t1/4
)
.
We now prove Lemma 4 in Section 6.2.
Proof. Proof of Lemma 4. For all y ∈ Y , it holds that
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, y) ≤
T−1∑
t=1
Lt(xt, y) + LT (x∗, y) +G‖xT − x∗‖ since LT is G-Lipschitz
≤
T∑
t=1
Lt(x∗, y) +G
T∑
t=1
‖xt − x∗‖ since each Lt is G-Lipschitz
≤
T∑
t=1
Lt(xT+1, y) +GT ‖x∗ − xT+1‖+G
T∑
t=1
‖xt − x∗‖.
It follows that
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, y) ≤ max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
Lt(xT+1, y) +GT ‖x∗ − xT+1‖+G
T∑
t=1
‖xt − x∗‖
=
T∑
t=1
Lt(xT+1, yT+1) +GT ‖x∗ − xT+1‖+G
T∑
t=1
‖xt − x∗‖
(by definition of yT+1)
= min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
Lt(x, y) +GT ‖x∗ − xT+1‖+G
T∑
t=1
‖xt − x∗‖.
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Subtracting in both sides
∑T
t=1 Lt(xt, yt), we get
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, y)−
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, yt)
≤ min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
Lt(x, y) −
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, yt) +GT ‖x∗ − xT+1‖+G
T∑
t=1
‖xt − x∗‖
≤ 8G
2
H
(1 + ln(T )) +GT ‖x∗ − xT+1‖+G
T∑
t=1
‖xt − x∗‖ By Theorem 1
≤ 8G
2
H
(1 + ln(T )) +
G3/2D
1/2
XY (d ln(T ) ln(
d
δ ))
1/4T 3/4
H1/2
+G
T∑
t=1
‖xt − x∗‖ by Lemma 5
≤ 8G
2
H
(1 + ln(T )) +
G3/2D
1/2
XY (d ln(T ) ln(
d
δ ))
1/4T 3/4
H1/2
+
G3/2D
1/2
XY (d ln(
d
δ ))
1/4
H1/2
T∑
t=1
ln1/4(t)
t1/4
by Lemma 5
≤ 8G
2
H
(1 + ln(T )) +
G3/2D
1/2
XY (d ln(T ) ln(
d
δ ))
1/4T 3/4
H1/2
+
G3/2D
1/2
XY (d ln(
d
δ ))
1/4
H1/2
∫ T
1
ln1/4(t)
t1/4
dt
=
8G2
H
(1 + ln(T )) +O
(G3/2D1/2XY (d ln(T ) ln(dδ ))1/4T 3/4
H1/2
)
with probability at least 1 − δT (by using a union bound in the second to last inequality). Setting
δ = 1/T 2 yields the result.
We are ready to prove Theorem 4.
Proof. Proof of Theorem 4. For any y ∈ Y , by adding up Equation (9), we have that
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, y) ≤
T∑
t=1
L¯t(xt, y) +HD2Y T.
This implies
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, y) ≤ max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
L¯t(xt, y) +HD2Y T.
Therefore, we have
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, y)−
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, yt)
≤ max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, y)−
T∑
t=1
L¯t(xt, yt) + THD2X by Equation (9)
≤ max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
L¯t(xt, y)−
T∑
t=1
L¯t(xt, yt) + THD2X + THD2Y
≤ 8(G+ 2H(DX +DY ))
2
H
(1 + ln(T ))+
O
( (G + 2H(DX +DY ))3/2D1/2XY (d ln(T ) ln(dT ))1/4T 3/4
H1/2
)
+ TH(D2X +D
2
Y )
(with probability at least 1− 1
T
, by Lemma 4).
Since
(G+ 2H(DX +DY ))
3/2
=(G3 + 6G2H(DX +DY ) + 12GH
2(DX +DY )
2 + 8H3(DX +DY )
3)1/2
≤G3/2 + (6G2H(DX +DY ))1/2 + (12GH2(DX +DY )2)1/2 + (8H3(DX +DY )3)1/2,
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choosing H = T−1/6 yields the result in Eq (15). In addition, the high probability bound implies
that
E
[
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, y)−
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, yt)
]
= O˜(T 5/6).
Now, using Eq (14), we have
Regret(T ) ≤ E
[
max
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, y)−
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, yt)
]
+ E
[ T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, yt)
]
−min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
E
[ T∑
t=1
Lt(x, y)
]
≤ O˜(T 5/6) + O˜(T 5/6) = O˜(T 5/6),
where the first term is bounded by the equation above and the second term is bounded by the SP-
regret of the SP-FTL algorithm from Theorem 2 using the regularization factorH = T−1/6.
6.4 Proof of PD-RFTL for OCOwK
In this section we present the analysis of PD-RFTL, applied to the OCOwK problem.
Proof. Proof of Theorem 5. Using the O(
√
T ) regret bound for the Follow-The-Leader (FTL) algo-
rithm in the online convex optimization setting, we have
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, yt) =
T∑
t=1
ft(xt) ≤ min
x
T∑
t=1
ft(x) +O(
√
T ) = min
x
T∑
t=1
Lt(x, yt) +O(
√
T ), (21)
and
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, yt) =
T∑
t=1
gt(yt) ≥ max
y
T∑
t=1
gt(y)−O(
√
T ) = max
y
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, y)− O(
√
T ). (22)
Let L¯(x, y) = E[Lt(x, y)] for any x ∈ X, y ∈ Y . Let (x∗, y∗) be the saddle point of L¯, satisfying
L¯(x∗, y∗) = max
y∈Y
L¯(x∗, y) = min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
L¯(x, y). (23)
We have
E
[
max
y
T∑
t=1
Lt(xt, y)
]
−min
x∈X
max
y≥0
E
[
T∑
t=1
Lt(x, y)
]
≤ E
[
min
x
T∑
t=1
Lt(x, yt)
]
−min
x∈X
max
y≥0
E
[
T∑
t=1
Lt(x, y)
]
+O(
√
T ) by Equations (21), (22)
= E
[
min
x
T∑
t=1
Lt(x, yt)
]
−
T∑
t=1
L(x∗, y∗) +O(
√
T ) by Equation (23)
≤ E
[
T∑
t=1
Lt(x
∗, yt)
]
−
T∑
t=1
L(x∗, y∗) +O(
√
T ) because min
x
T∑
t=1
Lt(x, yt) ≤
T∑
t=1
Lt(x
∗, yt)
= E
[
T∑
t=1
(L(x∗, yt)− L(x∗, y∗))
]
+O(
√
T )
≤ 0 +O(
√
T ).
The second to last step uses the fact that Lt is drawn i.i.d., and yt only depends on L1, · · · , Lt−1, so
we can replace Lt(·) by L¯(·). The last step uses Equation (23) again.
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7 Numerical Experiments
7.1 Individual-Regret and SP-Regret
To further illustrate the relationship between SP-regret and individual-regret and the impossibility
result of Theorem 3, we compare the performance of two online algorithms numerically. The first
algorithm is SP-FTL defined in Algorithm 1. In the second algorithm, which we call OGDA, player
1 applies online gradient descent to function Lt(·, yt) and player 2 applies online gradient ascent to
function Lt(xt, ·).
We generated two different instances. In both instances, we assumeX = Y = [−10, 10]. The payoff
functions in both instances are the same for t = 1, ..., ⌊T/3⌋, given by Lt(x, y) = xy+ 12‖x−2‖2−
1
2‖x+1‖2. In Instance 1, for t = ⌊T/3⌋+1, ...T , we defineLt(x, y) = xy+ 12‖x+1‖2− 12‖x+2‖2.
In Instance 2 for t = ⌊T/3⌋+ 1, ...T , we define Lt(x, y) = xy + 12‖x + 1‖2 − 12‖x − 3‖2. Since
these functions are strongly convex-concave, when players use OGDA with step size O(1t ), they are
both guaranteed logarithmic individual-regret.
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Figure 1: SP-regret on instance 1 (left) and instance 2 (right) of SP-FTL and OGDA.
Note. Here we define the SP Regret of Player 1 (SP Reg. P1) as
∑T
t=1 Lt(xt, yt) −
minx∈X maxy∈Y
∑T
t=1 Lt(x, y) and the SP Regret of Player 2 (SP Reg. P2) as
minx∈X maxy∈Y
∑T
t=1 Lt(x, y) −
∑T
t=1 Lt(xt, yt). According to this definition, we have
SP REG. P1= −SP REG. P2, and SP-regret of OGDA is equal to |SP REG. P1| = |SP REG. P2|.
In Figure 1, we plot the SP-regret of the two instances. On the left, it can be seen that the SP-regret
of OGDA increases significantly after the payoff function switches at ⌊T/3⌋, while the SP-regret of
SP-FTL remains small throughout the entire horizon.
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Figure 2: Individual Regrets on Instance 1 (left) and Instance 2 (right) of Algorithms: SP-FTL and
OGDA.
Note. The Individual Regret (Indiv. Reg.) can be negative as we compare a sequence of dynamic
decisions against the best fixed decision in hindsight.
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From Figure 2, we can observe when both players use the OGDA algorithm, their individual-regrets
are small. However, when when they use SP-FTL, at least one player suffers from high individual-
regret. Figures 1 and 2 verify Theorem 3, which states that no algorithm can achieve both sublinear
SP-regret and sublinear individual-regret.
7.2 SP-FTL and OGDA for the OCOwK problem
In this section, we compare the numerical performance of SP-FTL and OGDA (Online Gradient
Descent/Ascent) for solving a OCOwK problem. In OGDA, player 1 applies online gradient descent
to function Lt(·, yt) and player 2 applies online gradient ascent to function Lt(xt, ·). The proof for
Theorem 5 can also show that OGDA has a regret of O(
√
T ) (see Remark 1).
We construct a numerical example where for each iteration t = 1, ..., T , the decision maker chooses
an action xt ∈ X = [0, 20]. The reward function is rt = −x2 + btx where bt ∼ U [0, 20]. There
are two types of resources with budgetsB1 and B2. The consumption function for the first resource
is given by ct,1 = (atx)
2 + 50x where at ∼ U [0, 3], and the consumption function for the is
ct,2 = x. We assume the budgets are some linear functions of T , B1(T ) and B2(T ) respectively. In
our simulations B1 and B2 are chosen so that playing the optimal solution to the problem without
budgets is no longer optimal.
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Figure 3: Performance of SP-FTL and OGDA in the OCOwK problem.
Figure 3 compares the performance of SP-FTL vs OGDA on the OCOwK instance defined above.
Performance is measured as the ratio of total reward incurred by the algorithm and the solution to
Equation (12) across 25 simulation runs. It can be observed that both algorithms indeed improve
their performance as T increases. Moreover, it can be observed that while OGDA has worse perfor-
mance for small values of T , the rate at which performance improves is greater than that for SP-FTL,
which is consistent with our theoretical results that SP-FTL has O˜(T 5/6) regret and OGDA (or PD-
FTL) has O(
√
T ) regret.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we introduced the Online Saddle Point problem. In this problem, we consider two play-
ers that jointly play an arbitrary sequence of convex-concave games against Nature. This problem
is a generalization of the classical Online Convex Optimization problem, which focuses on a sin-
gle player. The objective is to minimize the saddle-point regret (SP-regret), defined as the absolute
difference between the cumulative payoffs and the saddle point value of the game in hindsight.
We proposed an algorithm SP-FTL for the Online Saddle Point problem and showed that it achieves
O˜(
√
T ) SP-regret for a game with T periods. In the special case where the payoff functions are
strongly convex-concave,we showed that the algorithm attainsO(log T ) SP-regret. Furthermore,we
proved that if the sequence of payoff functions are chosen arbitrarily, any algorithm with o(T ) regret
for the Online Convex Optimization problem may incur Ω(T ) SP-regret in the worst case. This
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implies that all existing algorithms for the Online ConvexOptimization problem cannot be applied to
the Online Saddle Point problem. Moreover, we showed how our algorithm can be applied to solve
the problem of Stochastic Online Convex Optimization with Knapsacks. Finally, we performed
some numerical simulations to validate our results.
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